Mahan’s intent is extremely conspicuous and he offers little qualification about his desire to increase the size and relevance the US Navy to achieve the interests of the state; however his theories are largely insufficient when examining a large amount of technological, geographic, and strategic factors. In his words, “Naval strategy has indeed for its end to found, support, and increase, as well in peace as in war, the sea power of a country. He offers no scientific validity to his assumptions and prepositions, only that history has shown with clarity in specific circumstances that naval power has been decisive to achieve the ends of the state.
Mahan saw limited utility in naval bombardment, amphibious operations, or operations other than the “true end of naval war… to preponderate over the enemy’s navy and so control the sea. Despite the technological development of the torpedo and advancement of undersea warfare, which scuttled the majority of his analysis shortly after its publication, his theory remains a staple of maritime professionals to characterize the nature of naval power and naval power projection. There is little mention of joint integration, and in many respects Mahan considered naval power to be the supported element of military power to achieve success.
After development of airpower and the failure of land, naval, or airpower forces to break the stalemate of the First World War, Giulio Douhet developed a visionary theory of using airpower alone to win the next great conflict. Douhet was captivated by the purity of airpower as a decisive force to a point of zealotry. He believed a nation sufficiently equipped with offensive airpower capabilities would be able to seize the initiative at the outset of hostilities; this initiative, coupled with n adversary’s difficulty in generating an effective defensive force across the complete line of operations, would lead to a battle plane laden with weapons, ranging from conventional bombs to poison gas, to destroy an enemy’s aerial fleet on the ground and bomb the population into submission. The resultant pressure from the population on the government would make the government sue for peace.
A summary of his maxims in one sentence follows: an independent air force should attack the enemy (with a dedicated bomber force) and “inflict the greatest damage in the shortest possible time” to seize competitive advantage through the air because the bomber will always get through resulting in victory. Douhet’s revolutionary vision for airpower elevated strategic thinking with respect to airpower’s utilization to achieve a state’s objectives in conflict; however, his vision was largely myopic, geocentric, and ephemeral because of technological developments.
Douhet displayed tremendous insight when examining the role of aircraft beyond their historical, supporting role conducting reconnaissance and intelligence missions. He saw the true power of the aircraft to reach vital centers far beyond the forward line of troops, and he was also visionary by highlighting airpower’s use as a decisive element of war. His vision was shortsighted in many ways, though. First, he wrote largely from an Italian perspective where his country was guarded by the Alps and the Mediterranean Sea.
Second, he dismissed the relativity of naval and ground threats, which both became very real throughout WWII, and despite Sir Arthur Harris’s best efforts to firebomb the Germans into submission, the morale of the German people did not force the German government to sue for peace. Third, defensive use of airpower was critical to save Great Britain during the Battle of Britain and preserved the state’s ability to continue fighting in the war.
Finally, technological advances in RADAR provided tremendous ability to highlight incoming aircraft and adequately defend the homeland, severely encumbering the big sky theory that was critical to Douhet’s central premise. Dr. Everett Dolman proffers a pragmatic theory about strategy; his viewpoint is that strategy is “an unending process that can never lead to conclusion… continuation is the goal of strategy-not culmination. ” He defines strategy as “a plan for attaining continuing advantage. Examination of “victory” in a temporary sense is revolutionary with respect to theory, especially military theory, and his tenet of continuing advantage as the ultimate goal of strategy shifts the standard paradigm of Clausewitz. Mahan, and Douhet amongst many other interim theorists.
Strategy does not end upon the surrender of the enemy, and in many cases the most difficult areas of strategy commence. Dolman goes as far to say a significant military victory can still have very little impact when considered with the “diplomatic, socio-cultural, economic, and information realms. His incorporation of multiple instruments of power into “pure strategy” is an illuminating strength benefitting any strategist formulating a plan for strategic effect. In this manner, “strategists seek to increase available options by manipulating structure and context. ” Dolman analyzes Clausewitz’s maxims heavily and concludes the unique nature of each conflict requires modifications of theory to achieve strategic effects in the present to shape continuing advantage for the future.
Dolman’s perspective on strategy springs from a variety of sources with his origins chiefly springing from the study of contested space in his book, Astropolitik, and through his study of strategy from multiple perspectives at SAASS. His theory holds a tremendous amount of merit because continuation of conflict usually extends beyond the cessation of hostilities. For example, it is clear the U. S. led coalition’s military victory in Iraq was overwhelming and peacekeeping operations commenced after open hostilities in 2003.
The United States formally completed its withdrawal in December 2011, however in May of 2015 President Obama continued the state of national emergency because of the failure to stabilize the state and the ISIS insurgency. Viewed from a Dolmanian perspective, this illustration indicates great military victories are ephemeral, and ceding continuing advantage in the Iraqi conflict was a product of failed, longitudinal strategy. Theory is an exceptional starting point for a strategist, but all theories need to be taken in context of the theorist’s bias to be of value to a strategist.
Clausewitz provides an exceptional maxim to illustrate this point: “Theory exists so that one need not start afresh each time sorting out the material and plowing through it, but will find it ready to hand and in good order. ” Examination of the four theorists above indicates many approaches to gain advantage and achieve the strategist’s desired effects. Clausewitz’s theory is an exceptional basis for any strategist, however, a strategist seeking joint integration will find himself severely wanting if he relies upon Clausewitz alone.
Mahan’s six key factors are exceptional starting points for a strategist to evaluate environmental context; however, many countries, especially landlocked countries, cannot afford or obtain expansive navies to support their security strategies. Douhet’s principles of initiative, offense, and targeting the will of the population are salient for a strategist to consider; however a strategist who argues loading canisters of poison gas in warplanes, excluding defense to a fault for offense, and a pure strategic approach from the air will face tremendous challenges in most circumstances to gain approval and buy in for the strategy.
Dolman’s perspective of superior strategy that focuses on developing continuing advantage in an eternal sense will greatly assist a strategist hoping to incorporate stability operations into initial plans, incorporate joint effects, and manage context appropriately to attain the ends in accordance with policy objectives; however, the realities of fiscal constraints, congressional mandates, and the political environment often dictate seeking short-term gains in the hope of further evaluation and subsequent development of strategy.
The relationship between theory and strategy is dependent upon the strategist’s context, objectives, ends, ways, and means available to him. If a strategist is artificially constrained (maximum boots on the ground, no ground troops, withdrawal in six months, etc) a strategist must either amend those constraints or seek theories that enable her to maximize her utility in that context. In this perspective, Clausewitz’s theory of genius will always be salient.
It is imperative that a strategist is able to incorporate multiple perspectives and develop the best solution for the context provided. For this reason, the relationship between strategy and theory could be anything from nothing at all to everything. It depends upon the strategist and the ability for him to exercise judgment when creating a strategy to manage context for continuing advantage.