Internal reasons why Authoritarian Regimes may become unstable and breakdown To understand which form of regimes are the most stable its important to look at certain factors that can destabilise the authoritarian regimes. The article, ‘The breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes’, in the Journal ‘The Western Political Quarterly’ by Robert H. Dix, gives some keys reasons why authoritarian regimes breakdown and become unstable. The first and most intuitive reason for regime breakdown is simply a lack of overall performance, especially when it come to the economy.
Overall declines in economic growth, unemployment levels or even an all out economic collapse can put a lot of pressure on regime leaders. In regimes supported by a small collective of wealthy businessmen, this support may be withdrawn with what they see as the leader inaptitude to rule and govern a successful country built on a strong economy. Especially in many military dictatorships, where a strong background in economics isn’t always there, a poor economy can lead to increased instability.
With high levels of unemployment, high ranking officials may decide to ‘return to the barracks’ or if not there may be a split amongst officials which could lead to a series of coup d’etat in quick succession. In a regime crisis caused by economic difficulties, the ruling elite in any kind of authoritarian regime divide. In military regimes, that division itself tends to persuade many officers that the time has come for a return to the barracks. In personalist regimes, he ruling elite narrows exclude moderates from access to increasingly scarce sources of wealth.
Bratton and van de Walle say this ostracisation of former allies can lead them to side with opposition forces. Ruling parties often attempt to distract economic shortcomings and unrest within the public from by granting them modest political rights. This strategy only works sometimes, but it works often enough to extend the average lifetime of single-party regimes. Another cause of breakdown is ‘Regime Delegitimisation’, the literal withdrawal of legitimacy.
In many regimes, those in power have often reached the top in ways that aren’t seen as legitimate in the procedural sense as there is no commonly agreed or definitive way to gain and retain power. In the absence of a generally accepted mode of attaining power, regimes become heavily dependent on their behaviour and effectiveness at performing promised tasks; such as helping the economy, reducing corruption. If and when these promises are broken they can expect popular uprising to destabilise the state. A third internal reason for regime breakdown and instability is the internal competition of those vying for overall control.
Observers of authoritarian governments have noted, politics in such regimes involves factionalism, competition, and strain. The competition among rival factions, however, takes different forms in different kinds of authoritarian regimes and has different consequences. In her analysis of over 130 countries spanning a period of 70 years Geddes concluded that Military governments contain inherent sources of fragility that make them far less durable than other kinds of authoritarianism. Consequently, they last less long and are more easily destabilised than are other types of dictatorship.
She found that Personalist regimes lasted longer than military regimes but suffered collapse when faced with two situations: If leader dies or becomes quite ill that undermines repressive capacity centralised in his hands; or when a poor economy prevents the distribution of benefits and patronage to its support networks. Geddes concluded her findings by say that most stable form of authoritarian regimes were the one-party states. Geddes offers an explanation for this pattern of variable stability. She says that military regimes find it harder to controlled withstand popular uprisings because they have weak claim to power.
More often than not the military main goal is to stay united as a military, rather than a ruling elite. They see them selves as moral arbiters and prefer to resolve conflict through negotiations. Not all military personnel want to remain in power, but all want the military to remain united. So when factional differences arise, the military is likely to negotiate its way out of power peacefully. Its also relatively easier for a military regime to step down as they have a safe exit strategy – a return to barracks. They can then take a back seat while maintaining interest in safeguarding its resources and autonomy.
Personalist regimes display a greater cohesion and do not break up as easily. They also tend to root themselves in society through more developed networks through patronage. The result is to ensure loyalty among important groups in society. Such loyalty is strong however only while the leader has economic resources. As a rule, those who have made their way to the top within the regime are completely dependent for their position on the ruling leader. They lose everything when the leader falls. This gives them a strong incentive to remain to resist change as long as possible.
Support networks take the iew that it’s better if we all cooperate in supporting the leader. These regimes tend to have a bloody end (coup, riots) because, in the face of exogenous shocks or trouble, the regime is likely to ‘circle its wagons until it is defeated. Geddes states that this gives personalist regimes greater staying power than military regimes. One-party regimes also display relative unity. Different groups within the party have a common interest in monopolising power In addition, they have typically built up an elaborate system for rooting themselves, and thus controlling both the state apparatus and the larger society.
In the more pronounced cases, the different branches of the state and the various areas of social activity have been strictly subordinated to the leadership of the party. This makes one-party regimes more resistant to opposition. They have access to a stronger organisation of supporters within the population, and at the same time they find it easier to control dissidents. This endows them with a longer life expectancy.