As a result of Lydia’s actions, Danielle and Gemma have died. Therefore, the extent of Lydia’s criminal liability for their deaths must be explored. Lydia’s culpability for their Murders must be explored before lesser offences of manslaughter can be considered. The majority of law pertaining to Murder is found in the Common Law, rather than being defined in statutes like a great deal of criminal offences. Murder, as defined by Lord Coke, is when a man of “sound memory” at the age of “discretion”, “unlawfully” kills any “reasonable creature” in any “county of the realm”.
Prerequisites for murder include that the act take place “under the queen’s peace” with “malice aforethought”. 1 This means that the Defendant must not be legally insane, should be above the age of criminal responsibility, should have caused the death of the victim unlawfully, should be legally regarded as a human being and should be citizen of England or Wales. Also, the Defendant’s conduct should not be during wartime and they should have the intention to murder the victim. If all these requirements are satisfied then a Defendant will most likely be culpable for murder.
However, a partial defence of voluntary manslaughter can be put forward if the Defendant felt there were mitigating circumstances which could explain their actions. To prove that Lydia is guilty of the Victims’ murders, Lydia must satisfy both the actus reus and the mens rea for murder. Firstly, the actus reus must be proven, which means the prosecution must prove that Lydia unlawfully caused the deaths of the victims without a lawful excuse. In the scenario, Danielle was “killed instantly”, therefore the condition that death must occur has been fulfilled and the requirement that the Victim ust legally be a human being is also fulfilled.
A significant requirement for the actus reus for murder to be fulfilled is that the Defendant must have caused the death of the victim. The Defendant must fulfil the causation principles i. e. the Defendant must be a factual cause of the victim’s death, and if so must then also be found to be the legal cause of death. Factual causation is proven by the “but for” test established in the case of White2. In this case the Defendant administered poison to his mother with the intention of killing her, however immediately after taking a sip of the poison, the victim suffered a heart attack.
The tests asks if but for the Defendant’s actions, would the victim still be alive? The Defendant was not a factual cause of death as it was found that the Victim suffered a heart attack which was independent from ingesting the poison. Therefore, “but for” the Defendant’s actions the victim would still be dead. In the case of Lydia, “but for” Lydia throwing the law reports over the balcony, Danielle would not be dead, therefore Lydia is the factual cause of her death. However, legal causation must also be proved as factual causation is very broad and there are many remote factors.
For legal causation to be proven, the Defendant must be an operative or substantial cause of the victim’s death and the chain of legal causation must remain unbroken. Intervening factors may only break the chain and take over as the legal cause of the victim’s death if they are separate and completely independent of the Defendant’s actions and are also a substantial cause of death. As Danielle had a pre-existing medical condition and was therefore more likely to be killed by Lydia’s actions then most people, Lydia may argue that her pre-existing medical condition broke the chain of legal causation and took over the substantial cause of death.
According to the precedent set in the case of Hayward3 this argument would be unsuccessful. In this case the Defendant and his wife had an altercation, during which the wife ran into the road with the Defendant in pursuit making violent threats towards her. The victim then fell down on the road and died. Medical evidence showed the victim had a persistent thymus gland which could lead to death in circumstances where the victim was frightened and physically exerted. The Defendant argued that the pre-existing medical condition took over and he was therefore not the legal cause of her death.
However, it was held that in circumstances where a pre-existing medical condition made the victim more susceptible to death does not break the chain of legal causation and the Defendant must take the victim as they find them. Therefore, Lydia is the legal cause of Danielle’s death despite the Victim’s pre-existing medical condition as the Defendant must take the Victim as they find them. By using the “but for” test established in White it is clear that but for Lydia’s actions Gemma would still be alive, therefore Lydia is the factual cause of her death. Legal causation must then be proven.
Although Gemma fainted and hit her head on the photocopier, this was a direct result of Lydia’s actions and is not an intervening factor independent of Lydia’s actions. This assertion is supported by Hayward4 where it was held that you must take your victim as you find them. Also, as Lydia is the legal cause of Gemma’s death despite not physically impacting her is supported by this case as the judge stated that “death from fright alone”, “caused by an illegal act” was enough to determine the act to be the legal cause of death. Lydia’s culpability for the death of Gemma must then be investigated.
Initially, Lydia’s liability for Gemma’s murder should be assessed by examining whether she satisfies the actus reus and mens rea for Gemma’s murder. Gemma’s death may not have been caused by Lydia as Gemma’s life-support treatment was turned off and according to Airedale NHS Trust v Bland5 a postvegetative state is not considered death. However, if it is proven that death occurred, Lydia’s mens rea for Gemma’s death would then have to be explored. There are no other factors which could limit or diminish Lydia’s liability for Danielle or Gemma’s death.
Lydia has the actus reus for Danielle’s murder as she satisfies all the requirements for it. Therefore, it is the job of the prosecution to then establish whether she also has the mens rea for her Victims’ murder. The mens rea for murder is the intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm. There are two types of intention: direct intention and oblique intention. Direct intention as defined by James LJ in Mohan6 is the “decision” to bring about a “particular consequence” no matter whether the Defendant “desired that consequence or not”.
In the words of R. A. Duff7 direct intent can be construed from the Defendant’s actions if the Defendant would consider himself a “failure” if the “relevant consequence” did not occur. Lydia stated that she had no “malice” whatsoever to Danielle or Gemma and only intended to scare Jasmine. By applying Mohan8 it is clear that Lydia did not make the decision to throw the law reports in order to kill Danielle and would not consider herself to have failed if her actions did not cause the death of Danielle.
Therefore, Lydia did not display direct intent to kill Danielle and whether or not Lydia displayed oblique intent must be explored. The cases of R v Maloney9 and Hancock and Shankland10 provided some confusion on what degree of foresight was required for a jury to infer intention from a Defendant’s actions. In Nedrick11 it was established that the jury should ask how “probable” the consequences from the Defendant’s voluntary act were and if the Defendant foresaw them.
Woollin12 approved of the approach in Nedrick however made it clear that the jury should only infer intention from the Defendant’s conduct where they foresaw that it was “virtually certain” that their actions would cause death. In the case of Lydia, it is unlikely that a jury would decide that Lydia foresaw her actions would be “virtually certain” to cause the death of Danielle. Therefore, Lydia may not be culpable for the murder of Danielle as she may lack the mens rea. In a similar manner, Lydia lacks direct intent to cause Gemma’s death and does not display oblique intention as a “sober” and “reasonable” person would ot foresee that by throwing heavy volumes over a balcony, Danielle would die which would then result in the death of Gemma. When the mens rea for murder is not present, the Defendant will not be liable for voluntary manslaughter but instead will be culpable for an offence of involuntary manslaughter. For Lydia to be culpable for constructive manslaughter it must be proven that she “intentionally did an act” that was “criminally unlawful”, “dangerous” and the act “caused the victim’s death”.
These requirements are confirmed by the HL in DPP v Newbury13. This case involved two boys who pushed a paving stone off a railway bridge as a train was approaching. The stone came through the cab and killed a guard. The HL upheld the Defendants’ convictions of manslaughter as they had the mens rea for the act which was also unlawful and dangerous. Lord Salmon stated that for a conviction of constructive manslaughter proof of mens rea was required but the Defendant only had to have the intention to “do the acts which constitute the crime”.
This means the Defendant must only have the mens rea for the unlawful act to be culpable for constructive manslaughter. Lydia satisfies this requirement as she had a clear intention to throw the law reports off the balcony and unlike the use of self-defence in Scarlett14 Lydia’s actions are clearly “criminally unlawful”. Also, Lydia’s actions satisfy the test set out in Church15 which deems an act “dangerous” if all “sober and reasonable” people recognise that the act would cause the other person to be subjected to the “risk of some harm”.
The decision in R v JM and SM16 further clarifies this as it states that there is no requirement that the “reasonable bystander” would recognise the “form” of harm that would ensue from the unlawful act but that there would be a “risk of some harm”. From Lydia’s actions it is clear that “reasonable” and “sober” people would foresee a risk of harm from throwing heavy law reports off a balcony into an area where students are working.
Finally, as Lydia has satisfied the actus reus for murder, it has already been stablished that her actions are the factual and legal cause of Danielle’s death. As the same unlawful act caused Gemma’s death, by satisfying the requirements for constructive manslaughter for Danielle’s death, Lydia will also be culpable for the constructive manslaughter of Gemma. Also, as Lydia’s unlawful act was directed at Jasmine rather than Danielle or Gemma, according to the precedent set in cases such as Latimer17 and Mitchell18 this would not decrease her liability for constructive manslaughter as the “malice” is transferred.
Therefore, it is highly probable that Lydia would be convicted of constructive manslaughter. Lydia may be less likely to be charged with gross negligence manslaughter as most cases involve a gross breach of a duty of care the Defendant already owed the Victim which caused their death and in Lydia’s circumstance, she owed no duty of care to Danielle or Gemma. However, Lydia could be convicted with Manslaughter by way of recklessness. Based on the case law and her conduct, Lydia would be convicted for the constructive manslaughter of both Danielle and Gemma.
