Since the time of our friend Eve, the tempting fruit, and that pesky snake, mankind has been in pursuit of knowledge and all that it has to offer. We have toiled trying to cultivate it, use it, and evolve it since the dawn of man and have only succeeded in spite of our innate ignorance. Socrates said it best, “I only know that I know nothing. ” But can a quote that is as old as philosophy itself hold any relevance in a time like ours, where devices the size of our palms give us innumerable resources to extend our knowledge?
Well, if we fast-forward over a millennium from Socrates in the 5th century B. C. o, what we may call, the father of modern western philosophy, Rene Descartes, one might assume that, even then, the quote does not apply. But one of Descartes’ most well-known arguments is almost born from it. Descartes’ dream argument fuels the thought that we can’t guarantee our knowledge, on the grounds that we can be deceived by something we often take for granted -our senses.
Now, while, for our purposes, he may be seen as the philosophical father, Descartes sends some of his children astray with this notion. Notably, G. E. Moore, a 20th century English philosopher, argued against Descartes’ idea because hat we can determine as knowledge is supported by the evidence provided through our senses, and evidence, or justification, is what completes the holy trifecta of knowledge: true beliefs which are justified. Moore contends Descartes’ dream argument first by inverting it, and then critiquing it as “inconsistent.
Although Moore presents sound arguments against Descartes, his methods ultimately fail to prove Descartes wrong because, by inverting Descartes argument, Moore engages in a fallacy and, in critiquing Descartes’ inconsistency, he limits knowledge only to an assertion of mpirical evidence while negating evidence that can be gathered through reasoning. I, therefore, conclude that despite Moore’s efforts, Descartes’ dream argument remains a reasonable conjecture to maintain. In Descartes’ “First Meditation,” he finds himself doubting what he knows as reality for several reasons.
The first is that since senses can be deceived, they cannot be trusted. He follows that a very realistic dream can be, in many cases, impossible to distinguish from what we perceive as reality (Withrington, Class Handout). Descartes’ dream argument is founded in this uncertainty, saying that “.. here are never any sure signs by means of which being awake can be distinguished from being asleep. The result is that I begin to feel dazed, and this very feeling only reinforces the notion that I may be asleep. ” (Descartes 111). Descartes is admitting to a truth which is often overlooked.
He proceeds to posit that, if one can believe that there is an all-good, all- powerful God that wouldn’t allow humans to be deceived, then there is also the possibility of the existence of a “malicious demon,” whose sole purpose would be to trick us into thinking that what we experience is real, but it would actually be a lie Descartes 113). Furthermore, Descartes points out that it is possible to be fooled, not only in reality, but also in dreams. Moore actually gives us a statement that can help conceptualize Descartes’ dream argument in one of his Philosophical Papers title “Certainty. He says, “If it is not certain that you are not dreaming, then it is not certain that you are standing up. ” (Moore 29).
Meaning, one cannot confirm the things which are supposed to be true, because being awake is not something which can be determined with certainty. To Descartes, this is the case. But Moore argues Descartes point by lipping it on its head. Where Descartes view, according to Moore, would state “I don’t know that I’m not dreaming. So, I don’t know that I’m standing up,” Moore argues, “I know that l’m standing up. So, I know that I’m not dreaming. ” (Withrington, Class Handout).
By inverting it this way, Moore presumably presents an equally valid argument that begins with the same premise used by Descartes, while producing a conclusion that opposes the dream argument. But wait, there’s Moore. Moore goes on to point out an inconsistency in the dream argument. If you can question whether or not you are dreaming, then you eed to have been able to tell the difference between dreaming and being awake. In order to assert this difference, then you would have to trust your senses, which is exactly what is being questioned in the Descartes’ dream argument.
Simply put, “Descartes’ argument is inconsistent or self-defeating because the conclusion that he can never know he is not dreaming undermines the premise that he knows he has been deceived in dreams. ” (Withrington, Class Handout). It seems reasonable to leave the matter here, and agree with Moore. After all, anyone could have come to the same conclusions as Moore by just sing a little patience and a lot of common sense; he used reason. Upon further examination, however, there are problems with Moore’s arguments. Moore’s inversion of the dream argument is problematic because it is circular; it “begs the question,” so to speak.
The premise that Moore knows he is standing, is already taking for granted his ability to know with certainty whether he is, in fact, awake. He is assuming his conclusion, which makes his argument fallacious. The issue with Moore’s criticism of Descartes’ dream argument as inconsistent is that it is possible to have a dream within a dream. If one wakes up in a dream, then he or she is fully capable of differentiating between the act of sleeping, with possible resulting dreams, and being alert to a certain reality. This certainly does not mean, however, that one is actually awake.
Moore is depending on the point that we must rely entirely on tangible, physical evidence-our senses-to determine what we know to be true, but he is himself building his defense through reason. Moore’s argument that Descartes’ dream argument is self-defeating is, ironically, also self- defeating. I can, therefore, say with certainty that I have not een convinced by Moore’s arguments. A mistrust of the senses can be logically sustained. Even if it is possible to know with certainty that you are standing, as in Moore’s inversion, it may still just be the case that you know you are standing in a dream.
Although it is true that, in order to doubt that you’ve dreamed, you need to be able to tell the difference between being awake or asleep, as in Moore’s “inconsistency” critique, this doesn’t necessarily warrant an immediate and blind trust in the senses. Take Descartes as an example. He was contemporary to some of the most brilliant minds in history. But these brilliant minds were considered lunatics during their time because they asserted things which went against the observable, the senses.
For centuries, people thought the earth was the center of the universe and that everything, every other astronomical body, revolved around it, because they trusted their sight. Yet, pretty much all of humanity turned out to be wrong for having trusted their common sense. And in pursuit of debunking this illusion, lives were lost. It is not easy to doubt one’s entire existence. But given careful consideration, one must accept that our knowledge is subjected o our perception of reality, rather than reality itself.
Many of the things we accept as true, substantiated beliefs are not things we have even sensed for ourselves; rather, we take our knowledge on the “good authority” of people who are just as subjective and imperfect as we are. And while it may feel unreasonable to say that the many are wrong and the one is right, it wouldn’t be the first time that this is the case. It is safe to trust one’s senses, but, if we never question them, if inquiry is never provoked, then philosophy dies and even the pursuit of truth is moot.
