Few, when talking of the American Revolution, list the Battle of Monmouth among the significant battles. It was hardly a bloody battle, with only about seven-hundred total casualties. It was not a decisive battle, it was not a battle in which we gained or lost a key position, and it was not a battle in which we point to as an example of how to conduct an engagement. In fact, it was not a battle in which one can say that the Revolutionaries truly won. Yet, with all this, it was probably the battle that turned the tide of the Revolutionary War.
Beneath a blazing sun at Monmouth Courthouse, it was shown to the rest of the Continental Army that the training of Freidrich Von Stueben had, indeed, paid off. Here, Revolutionists stood toe to toe with the greatest Army in the world, and drove them off the field. ” Heroes were made here, such as the famous Molly Hays McCauly , better known as Molly Pitcher. In truth, and in accordance with legend, she took up her husband’s place at his cannon on Comb’s Hill after he had fallen. Another legend that began here was the insanely courageous moves of General “Mad” Anthony Wayne.
His hold against the Grenadiers earned him this nickname, which stuck until his death . Truly, this battle sent a rejuvenated spirit across the entire Continental Army. Contrary to popular belief, they could beat the British regulars. This would no longer be by some fluke, or by poor commanding on the British side, but by the excellent fighting that had been instilled on them during the harsh winter at Valley Forge. To set the stage for this battle, we must first understand what the British were thinking at the time. The British had not succeeded in “breaking the back of the rebellion” by occupying Philadelphia.
General Howe, who had prophesied this, was consequently fired and replaced by Sir Henry Clinton. Henry Clinton was widely regarded as both wiser and more energetic. He faced his first challenge when, in May of 1778, a French fleet, carrying 4,000 troops and consisting of 11 warships, set sail toward America. This force was far superior to any that the British could supply at the time. Fearing a new war with France, Clinton was ordered to detach about 8,000 of his 10,000 troops to the West Indies and Florida and send the rest to New York City. This was all supposed to be done by way of naval transport.
However, Clinton had hardly the vessels needed to transport the 3,000 horses that came with the troops. He decided instead to march the whole of his force to New York City, and detach the needed troops there. On June 17, 1778 Clinton began his march. His force consisted of 10,000 troops, which were accompanied, and hampered by, swarms of Tory refugees. The Tories turned out to be an incredible nuisance to Sir Clinton as he marched toward New York. The excessive amounts of baggage, and the poor wagons used to carry said baggage, slowed the progress of the British Regulars to, at times, nine miles a day.
This being said, the baggage train exceeded twelve miles in length. It is possible that one could have sat in the same spot for an entire day and never seen the end of this incredibly slow, incredibly long, and incredibly vulnerable procession. This is not to say that the Americans did not take great pride in hampering the progress of the British. As soon as the last Tory walked out of Philadelphia, the first American walked in. On June 18, 1778 Philadelphia became, once again, an American held city. As soon as the American flag was raised, they set out to be the “best nuisance possible to the British, ” as one skirmisher wrote.
General Maxwell did an excellent job, slowing the British movement to almost a crawl, as stated above. There was one minor engagement that was the direct cause of an act to be a thorn in the British side. At Crosswicks, three regiments under Cols. Frelinghusen, Van Dike, and Webster remained as the remainder of General Dickinson’s force began to withdraw, for they knew the enemy was close. As they began to disable a local bridge, a squad of the enemy appeared. “…with great zeal (we) began to repair the bridge, the planks of which had been pulled up, and the draw raised.
The British, not finding this humorous, quickly sent an advance force to dispatch the enemy. They were repelled by an unusually small party that became detached from its’ regiment. This was at the cost of four dead, and several more wounded. The British then attempted to cross a second bridge, the likes of which had been burned to ashes. A skirmish occurred at this bridge, also, and the Americans were able to hit a few British. A British officer and three men fell, while one American, a man named Clevinger, was killed.
In this way, the force repelled a small attack, one that may have “…saved Trenton and the county adjacent from rapine and desolation. ” At this point, General George Washington became a more aware of the situation that was unfolding in New Jersey. He began to realize the seriousness of a large British force moving through New Jersey. He told General Maxwell to keep him alert on “…any favorable circumstances that may present themselves. ” He then held a meeting with the Council of War, which was held on the farm of John Hart on the 24th and 25th of June.
This, however, yielded only one unifying concept; no one could agree on an action. There were two main factions which formed during these meetings. General Anthony Wayne, the boldest of the staff, and Major General Marquis de Lafayette, the youngest of the staff, urged for, at least, a partial attack on the column while it was vulnerable. They pointed out that the column was well over twelve miles long, and with Maxwell doing a superb job in slowing its’ progress, now was the time to find a weak point, and hit it hard. The second faction was spear-headed by General Lee.
Lee had little faith in the American regulars, and this showed in his suggestions to resort solely to guerilla combat, and avoid any confrontation with the British Regulars, whom he felt to be far superior to any American force . Eventually, Washington decided to compromise. He sent a little under half of his army to engage the British as they left Monmouth Courthouse on June 28, 1778. The force was to be led by General Lafeyette and now numbered just under 5,000 men. These included Morgan’s riflemen, 1,000 hand-selected troops under Gen. Wayne, 1,500 troops under Gen.
Scott, and Gen. Maxwell’s original delaying force. They dispatched themselves in the “…debatable ground between the two armies, ” except for Morgan’s Riflemen, who were sent to Shreve’s mill, where they could be most effective. Along the side of Monmouth road, Colonel Asher Holmes and his Monmouth militia waited with General Dickinson and the rest of the New Jersey militia . They were situated in a few points all along Dutch Lane, where, during the course of the battle, they hurled themselves “…so valiantly, so bloody, yet still in vain… ” against the mass of British regulars.
The main force of American regulars, under Washington, was disposed along the road from Cranbury to Englishtown, a few miles from the advanced guard. This was not to be a battle of surprise, however. After the skirmish at Crosswicks, the British rebuilt the bridge and crossed. It was obvious that there was a strong American presence, and Sir Clinton did take precautions, in order to be prepared should they prepare an attack. He divided his army to ensure that they would be ready for such an attack. The heavy artillery and ammunition wagons, which originally had brought up the rear, were now in the van of the procession.
This was done for two reasons. First off, the van traveled along a road much more suitable for heavy loads, and secondly, these items were now closer to the main body of the fighting units, which were lead by General Earl Cornwallis. Although it seemed as if they would remain close, this wagon train and its’ convoy, lead by General Knyphausen, eventually rode right by them and ended up a few miles down the road in Imlaystown. This convoy was made of 1500 soldiers, which consisted of Dragoons, Light-Infantry, Hessians, and organized bodies of Loyalists.
As Knyphausen passed Gen. Cornwallis and the main force, it summarily made the main body the rear guard . As the change became to become apparent, Gen. Clinton thought it for the best, considering the main body of supplies still lay in the rear, and that was what needed the most protection. Gen. Clinton was well aware that the enemy “needed these goods. ” It was not an enormous change, mostly a simple changing of positions to coincide with a more accurate plan. He than sent out a small “buffer” force to act as a lateral screen for the main army.
It was with this force that the Americans first skirmished with on the morning of the 28th. On the eve of the battle the Gen. Clinton’s army was still well over-extended. It was stretched along the Monmouth road from Smithburg to Dutch Lane, a distance of about eight miles. Then came Knyphausen’s army of about 1500, extending the lines another mile. The stage was now set to engulf in what would later become known as the Battle of Monmouth. After Washington had given what he had thought to be his last dispositions, another thorn arose in his side.
General Charles Lee, “…who’s every word and action throughout the whole of the early part of the engagement smelled of dissatisfaction and savored of treachery, ” decided to use his seniority to assume command of Gen. Lafayette’s force. This move, for whatever reason Lee had, absolutely enraged the Frenchman. The reasons for this move are unclear, however, it was widely whispered that Lee, English born, had plans to sabotage the plans of Washington in order to make his own predictions more accurate and accountable.
This theory may be a bit far-fetched, but there is also much evidence supporting Lee’s enormous ego, and his unquenchable thirst for glory. As shown through his actions at Monmouth, these accusations seem less inconceivable and more undeniable. At 3:00 AM on Sunday, June 28, 1778, the cumbersome British wagon train began to march toward the safety of Sandy-Hook. It was still conveyed by Knyphausen’s force of 1500 men . Before 8:00 AM the second division of the British troops, under Gen. Cornwallis, passed into Dutch Lane.
This was followed closely by the third division, under the personal command of Sir Clinton, which extended back to the Monmouth Courthouse. Around 5:00 AM, General Dickinson, in command of the New Jersey militia with about 800 men, got word to Washington that the British had begun to move toward Middletown. The General immediately ordered Lee to move to attack the enemy. At the same time, he sent his army in motion toward the British advance. Just before 8:00 AM, Wayne, with 700 men and a battery of six-pounders, was directed to make a frontal attack on the second division, which was commanded by Cornwallis.
While Wayne attacked, Lee would gain its’ read and capture it. Wayne had hardly begun to fire, when Lee sent orders to feint the attack. This aroused Lafayette’s suspicions, and he immediately sent two messages to Washington urging him to come to field of action . This proved to be one of the many saving actions in the day’s progress. Lee began to move when he heard of General Dickinson engaging the enemy, and, apparently, the enemy was falling back. He moves, but moves lethargically. He has yet to scout the ground, an assignment he had been given at midnight of the previous evening.
He soon becomes confused, for he is receiving reports that the British are both advancing and falling back. In fact, this is exactly what is happening. They are advancing on the rear guard, while falling to back to move the baggage out of the way. This error would easily have been avoided, had Lee performed the appropriate reconnaissance. Eventually, a very long hour after the two armies first met, Lee begins to get a clear picture of the battle in his head. He wants to encircle and capture the rear guard, but he tells none of his generals of the plan. He marches Col.
William Grayson’s unit, with 600 men and 4 artillery pieces, to the flanks, but then gives no orders. Lee then proceeds to move his main element to Monmouth courthouse, this being an attempt to encircle the rear guard . The British, upon seeing this maneuver at about 8:00 AM, immediately evacuate the courthouse. This leaves a large rear guard detachment and a gap between the divisions of Clinton and Cornwallis. An American cavalry commander by the name of Colonel Moylan sees this large gap. Angered at the lack of orders he has received, he orders a charge in an attempt to cut the two from each other and create disorder.
They were, however, stopped, not exactly by fighting, but by a large fence that prevented any progress from occurring . They simply had to turn around and retreat in a most disoriented fashion. This backward movement by the cavalry charge caused an enormous amount of confusion in the American lines. The troops which were sent forth to reinforce Wayne were now convinced that the retreating force was that of Wayne’s main body. Again, not receiving any orders, they fell back and began a slow, disorganized retreat. In truth, Wayne’s main body was currently withholding a large frontal assault by the Queen’s Rangers.
However, contradictory orders, and lack of real plan, eventually forced Wayne into the same disorganized retreat. Yet, Wayne was one of the few officers that actually kept his unit together, and was able to make feeble, but incredibly brave, attempt to return musket volley. Another unit which served well under these horrendous conditions was Colonel Stuart and his repel of the British Dragoons on our right flank. During the early course of the battle, the actions of these officers were two bright spots in what looked to be a rout .
